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Entitled to Understand
A Critical Look at Comparative Theology
Albertina Nugteren
Comparison as a Third Space
This essay grew out of the invitation to respond to Francis
Clooney’s presentation of his version of comparative theology,
and rephrases, in a modest way, what Alasdair MacIntyre poin
ted to when he asked if understanding religion is compatible
with believing in it (MacIntyre 1964, quoted in Wiebe 2005:
260ff.), a question that Donald Wiebe took to mean: Does un
derstanding religion require religious understanding (Wiebe
2005: 260)? I will not touch on any of the problems related to the
question if theology is more or less valid than religious studies.
What Clooney’s work triggers in me is, apart from a deep ad
miration for the depth and breadth of his knowledge of at least
two religious traditions, the challenge to reflect on who is best
equipped to compare and who is entitled to understand. At this
point I must introduce myself as a relative outsider: I am not a
theologian but an Indologist and a religious studies specialist.
The reason I was requested to respond to Clooney’s presenta
tion of comparative theology may be that we do have one thing
in common: the study of Indian religions.
Francis Clooney’s work in comparative theology is exe
cuted patiently, painstakingly, and with integrity.1 It creates a
self consciously composed locus of encounter in which a spe
cific type of interreligious dialogue occurs. Ideally, in his view,
the comparative theologian leaves behind the relative inno
cence of knowing only one tradition deeply, i.e. his/her own,
with merely fragmentary and often dismissive knowledge of
other traditions. To him, the ideal comparativist is uniquely
1 I consulted various of his books published since the 1990s,
especially his introductory chapters to Clooney 1993, 1996, 2008, as
well as some articles, such as Clooney 1997, 2002, 2007.
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positioned for a kind of intellectual and spiritual learning that
would not be possible for one who knows only one of them.
Clooney himself focuses on textual materials from specific cor
ners of Christianity, particularly its mystic traditions empha
sising devotional surrender, and specific devotional theology
within Hinduism, especially that of the south Indian Srivais
nava schools. In his extremely careful approach, with meticu
lous attention to scriptural detail, often engaging various com
mentaries on a single phrase, he gives ample room for the “for
eign” text to speak in all its layeredness, both in its own words
and in the commentarial traditions. After having thoroughly
studied such a text, he relies on his instincts (often triggered by
associative thinking) to bring in a fitting second text from his
own tradition with which he starts the comparison. In this way
he produces transgressive learning, both academically and spir
itually. What Clooney suggests is a theology that occurs only
after a particular comparative encounter has taken place, in the
shape of a comparison that has been executed fairly and metic
ulously. The result is a delicately balanced interior dialogue
from the pen of a single author. A definitive analysis and inter
pretation is not offered, let alone a grand statement essentialis
ing the two traditions.
He thus proposes a theology that is produced from the
unique position that accompanies comparative study: it brings
a refined understanding of both texts and, as such, a new light
to both traditions. This more intense way of learning and un
derstanding, in his view, goes beyond many well intended but
often necessarily lopsided encounters and comparisons. The
enterprise of comparative theology, in this North American ver
sion, thus emerges as the dialectical and dialogical activity of
closely reading and rereading texts, i.e. particular texts from
Hindu theologians like Vedantadeshika, together with texts
from Catholic mystics like Francis de Sales, Satakopan’s Tiru
vaymoli paired with Bernard of Clairvaux’s sermons on the
Song of Songs, or Patañjali’s Yogasutras with excerpts from the
Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola. This reading, rereading,
and comparing takes place on the new stage formed by the
meeting of two discrete, distinct, and until now separate tradi
tions, a stage where a contemporary North American theolo
gian is instrumental in making two voices heard: that of, for in
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stance, a south Indian theologian cum mystic who lived and
worked several centuries ago and that of a mystically inclined
father of the Church who likewise evokes the reader to lose
oneself in loving surrender to God.
It is clear that this more intense way of reading, learning,
and understanding demands high erudition, not least of all a
proficiency in languages, and a both scholarly and spiritual
sensitivity to the evocative power of texts produced long ago.
Clooney focuses emphatically on textual materials and leaves to
others the equally important fieldwork that is required to un
derstand the meaning that actual living people give to religious
issues and the way they shape their devotion in daily life. Com
parative theology thus creates a third space and becomes a
theology that is not content with comparing the two separate
spaces of the texts under scrutiny but instead is willing to be,
even anticipates being, transformed in the process. This makes
comparative theology a theology that may be deeply changed
by its attention to the details of multiple religious, theological,
and spiritual traditions.
Reading through various introductions to Clooney’s work
in comparative theology I admire the careful, eloquent, and
self conscious way in which he treads the ground. He appears
to anticipate most of the criticisms that might come his way by
proceeding with a cautious yet stubborn conviction. Despite
this cautious attitude, he obviously believes in his course, a
course determined by the comparative dynamic of reading
across the borders of two spiritual traditions and thus creating a
third space in which at the very least his own Christian theo
logy is expected to be deeply transformed by the experience of
the encounter.
Verstehen/Understanding as Faith Based?
It is exactly this extremely careful approach, with meticulous at
tention to scriptural details, that may well be able to win me
over. Yet this entire exercise of comparative theology is outspo
kenly faith grounded. According to Clooney, a comparative
theologian should have his/her roots in some particular reli
gious tradition, and have a commitment and engagement to it.
The terms “we,” “us,” “ours,” and “our own” abound. Who is
addressed and included here? Who feels self evidently and nat
152 INTERRELIGIOUS HERMENEUTICS IN PLURALISTIC EUROPE
urally enclosed by these references? I must admit I do not. Even
more so, I feel excluded from the entire exercise precisely on
this ground.
This easily and naturally supposed faith as a criterion, as a
precondition, strikes me as questionable. Is meticulous schol
arship not enough, along with empathy, integrity, sensitivity,
apart from language skills and philological endurance? Why
would a scholar of religion need to belong to a faith? Would it
not then rightfully be called theology otherwise? Or, to return
to the third space I mentioned above, the platform on which the
supposed intellectual, theological, and spiritual transformation
can take place: Is anyone who does not belong to either tradi
tion—or any religious tradition, for that matter—denied en
trance?
For the well trained comparativist, cautiously moving for
ward, examining details rather than entire religious systems,
what would be the advantage of belonging to a particular
tradition, preferably to one of the two being compared? Are
scholars who do not belong to a tradition – since there are many
religious studies specialists today who write highly sensitive
and insightful works on particular details of one or more reli
gious traditions located elsewhere in the world – not equally
equipped to produce what Clooney’s comparative theology is
aiming for? Would one need to be a theologian, a “belonger”
(Davie 1994) and a believer as well to be able to compare fruit
fully, creatively, and be willing to be transformed in the pro
cess, transcending both traditions by entering a new space, the
third space of deeper, maybe even shared, meanings and mes
sages?
In Clooney’s hands, comparative theology is distinguished
by attentiveness to the dynamics of theological and spiritual
learning, deepened and made complex through the close study
of two traditions, one of which is other than one’s own. The
first requirement for this experiment in comparative theology
would be historical, cultural, and linguistic expertise in (at
least) two traditions. The second requirement is that such a re
searcher (Clooney calls him “reader,” with a staggering down
play of the painstaking philological groundwork required for a
fair encounter of texts) would be persistent in the interrogation
of the ideas presented in the two texts. The third requirement
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would be openness to the full force of such a “foreign” text,
allowing a change of perspective that may even prove to be
radical. The fourth requirement would be that such an en
counter would not remain limited to the private sphere of the
solitary reader or even the selected company of experts, but
would benefit a much wider audience (Clooney 2008: 2).
What is at stake here, in my view, is the question how le
gitimate it would be to be transformed in the process and still
remain loyal to “one’s own tradition.” Considering Clooney’s
background as a Jesuit priest, I could well imagine that the
possible – or even probable – transformation in that third space
requires an anticipatory defence, justification, or legitimation.
Considering Clooney’s credentials as a Harvard scholar, the
shift from the status of mere observer to that of a spiritually
persuaded practitioner may also need some apologetics. Fur
thermore, considering Clooney’s association with Srivaisnava
scholars in southern India, in the light of nationalistic fervour,
his close engagement with “their” Vedantadeshika may well
raise anti colonial and anti Christian suspicions.2
Entitled to Understand?3
The only way I can attempt to access this endeavour of compar
ative theology critically is through the alleged spiritual trans
figuration to which Clooney himself points. Naturally, for aca
demia, by offering a (new) translation with fair attention to the
various commentaries, Clooney’s disclosure of a relatively un
known Hindu text would be sufficient justification for his ef
forts. His philological efforts are justified doubly by bringing in
a comparable text from “his own” tradition. But Clooney still
obviously wants more. This entire enterprise of entering a third
space beyond both texts may be productive, creative, and stim
ulating in the hands of a person like him, with the safeguard of
both an impressive scholarly record and a delicate even elo
2 As on various websites, added as readers’ reviews on publish
ers’ and booksellers’ pages.
3 This phrase is a variation on the title of an expert seminar “En
titled to Surrender,” organised by Norbert Hintersteiner around
Francis Clooney’s work, 5 July 2006, at Utrecht University.
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quent anticipation of whatever critique may come his way. In
other hands, however, such an enterprise may slide into the
same old pitfalls to which past comparative endeavours were
prone.
What could be the pitfall if comparative theology becomes,
for instance, a comparative (study of) spirituality? The revela
tory and evocative character of Verstehen so far transcends the
job description of the academic student of religion.4 Clooney
admits to a significant change in his own Christian theology
through an endeavour, comparative theology, that is explicitly
faith grounded. Applying Grace Davie’s useful distinction be
tween belonging and believing to the persistence of a form of
belief (or spirituality in its present connotation) in many situ
ations in which rather dramatically declining “belonging” can
be found, as is the case in western Europe today, would a com
parative spirituality be both more accessible and fool proof
than comparative theology in hands other than Clooney’s? He
speaks of transgressive learning: Does this point to what I indi
cated as that newly created third space of comparative theo
logy? In that case, would comparative spirituality be able to
speak of transgressive learning too, albeit not in the sense of a
newly created third space but in that of a newly accessed third
space, a space that is supposed to exist beyond all distinctions,
paradoxes, and otherness, a space that does not need to be
created but is always, perennially there, ready to be accessed by
the advancing spiritual adept. Comparative spirituality, then,
may also be a process of transgressive learning requiring a
faith: not belonging necessarily, but believing. As such, it
would not matter much whether the exercise is called compar
ative theology or comparative spirituality.
Anyone who speaks of something surpassing distinct
categories, discrete theological systems, enclosed “we” com
munities of peer believers, and especially the safe boundaries of
the ecclesiastical or scholarly status quo will be the recipient of
4 Please note that I am the one who is introducing the contested
notion of Verstehen, not Clooney. For an attempt to bridge the gap be
tween the two approaches of explanation and understanding by ap
plying the hermeneutical theory of Paul Ricoeur see Kepnes 1986.
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disdain, scepticism, and critique from various corners as well as
cheers, admiration, and even adoration from other corners. The
reading of ancient texts in a novel way is bound to draw com
ments, raise suspicions, and be experienced as intrusive by both
sides, particularly when it is called deep learning, and a first
person participatory perspective and “post objective” empathy
are required. At the same time, when considered from the angle
of interreligious dialogue, it may be seen as an intelligent re
sponse to today’s pluralistic life world in which religions no
longer stand alone. Although Clooney clearly leaves the study
of actual encounter in daily life to others, by reading beyond
boundaries he draws his readers along with him into a trans
formative process, making a particular contribution to interre
ligious understanding. Verstehen, then, in the last analysis, is re
ligious in nature (Waardenburg 1978: 228).
Clooney’s comparative theology, often far removed from
the more immediate arena of actual interreligious dialogue in
practice, distinguishes itself by two features: its empirical meth
od and its resistance to generalisations about particular reli
gions (Nicholson 2009: 620). Still, along with theology of reli
gions it has more or less a common genealogy in the compar
ative method of the late nineteenth century. It advertises itself
as a non hegemonic form of interreligious theological dis
course, patiently deferring issues of truth, but the problem of
theological hegemonism, although muted by adopting an em
pirical method and refraining from excessive generalisation, is
still apparent (Nicholson 2009: 620). Avoiding a totalising per
spective by emphasising the local and particular, it challenges
the discreteness and otherness of the various theologically de
fined religious traditions in the world, in Clooney’s case, the
conceptual constructions like “Hinduism” and “Christianity.”
Religious boundaries may thus be deconstructed, not as non ex
istent but rather as fluid and porous.
Comparative theology also rides the tide of globalisation. It
remains to be seen if there will be only one kind of winner in
the global marketplace of the future: either the extremely partic
ular and bounded, providing a cocooned kind of religious be
longing, or an extremely free trade in which belonging is only
momentous and collated, not a lifelong choice and commit
ment. There may well be many winners simultaneously, cater
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ing to the manifold and variegated needs. And as long as needs
are diverse, there will be many stalls and shops in the market.
The Hegelian synthesis (a third space in itself!) that many seek
today is readily provided by “mindstyle” magazines, spiritual
books, inspirational courses, and feel good programmes. Glo
balisation, commodification, and commercialisation, however,
create the illusion of an endless variety on offer, where, on
closer scrutiny, the goods are remarkably alike, as are the reli
gious goods that are being offered. Erasing national, cultural,
and linguistic boundaries, in addition to many obvious ad
vantages, also has the by effect that things soon begin to look
rather plain, flat, and interchangeable. Erasing religious boun
daries by a vague kind of spirituality or well intentioned uni
versalism may have produced a wider sense of self in the last
century, but it remains to be seen if there is much “deep
learning across religious boundaries” as Clooney advocates.5
Deep learning requires a tremendous effort and heavy sacri
fices, commitment to an ideal that may be driven by a spiritual,
mystical, philosophical, ecological, or even economic inspira
tion of inter being, but one has to start at home, and in that
sense I readily admit that Clooney has a point by starting from
his own rich Catholic tradition and his Jesuit heritage.
Comparative theology in Clooney’s hands breaks through
conventional boundaries by a well thought out juxtaposing of
particular texts, but even his extremely cautious approach
cannot relieve me of a sense of doubt and suspicion. In colonial
times, adventurous and greedy men sailed off to distant places,
especially the Orient, in the search for spices with which they
could preserve and season their bland food at home. Now, can
the same mistake be avoided here, i.e. that of interfering
thoughtlessly with far away people and their socio economic
infrastructures in this age for the sake of adding non Christian
spices to a Christian dish that may have become too bland? In
other words, aligning themselves with the forces of global
isation, the “we” that Clooney so self evidently uses may well
be blind to the fact that there is no power balance here. Many
5 See the title of his new book Comparative Theology: Deep Learning
across Religious Borders.
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are now well aware of the blind spots in the colonial enterprise,
such as blatant cultural assumptions and dramatically uneven
power relations. Yet many are still guilty of being mindless con
sumers on today’s markets.
In today’s global marketplace there is an unprecedented
variety of spices on offer, as well as an unprecedented variety
of religious writings from all times and traditions. Even if I still
feel slightly uncomfortable with Clooney’s project, I acknowl
edge its evocative power especially in learning to read closely
two texts from widely divergent traditions, texts which offer a
striking family resemblance not only in selected passages ex
tracted for easy quotations but even after disciplined and care
ful consideration of their overall message and meaning. If any
thing, Clooney teaches us to sit down and patiently immerse
ourselves in two ancient texts, read them from cover to cover,
and let them speak, singly as well as in interaction. Refraining
from generalising statements on the two religious systems in
which these two texts are embedded, in his final chapter he
limits his theology to an intimate conversation between the two
texts that have jointly come to life before him. At the very least
this is a disciplined exercise in close reading.
Religiosity as an Added Value?
Returning to the second of my initial questions, on what might
be the added value of being religious for a researcher in the
study of religion, I am well aware of the romantic and subjec
tive character of Verstehen, as proposed by Dilthey, and carried
on by scholars such as Van der Leeuw and Söderblom (Waar
denburg 1973: 53ff.). Those historians of religion who wanted to
apply this “understanding” in their field felt that the ration
alistic approaches of their time were not only explaining reli
gion but were also explaining it away. The term Verstehen was
introduced into philosophy and the human sciences in order to
contrast this type of knowing with the external objectifying
third person perspective of description and explanation. Does
the strenuous effort of learning to see in a new way, as indi
cated by Clooney’s comparative theology, require a grasping
that includes more than the observable part of religion? Re
garding this, W.C. Smith stated that “the whole path and sub
stance of religious life lies in its relation to what cannot be ob
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served.” Wiebe, who is known as a fierce opponent to this, re
sponds: “If Smith is right, faith cannot be known objectively
and its expressions can only be properly understood from with
in the faith experience,” thus concluding that, according to
Smith, an understanding of religion is impossible without reli
gious understanding: “a study of religion based upon that dis
tinction, therefore, becomes a kind of religious exercise” (Wiebe
2005: 264 68, esp. 266).
Here we see that even within the critical or academic study
of religion, which was, from the very beginning, intent on
avoiding such a metaphysical condition, one of the great writ
ers, W.C. Smith, took what is, in effect, a theological stance. The
academic study of religion is not a rejection of the religious
ideal in life but is, rather, an attempt to reflect upon that ideal.
Considering Clooney’s ideal, and that of many others engaged
in some kind of fair interreligious encounter, I cannot help but
see an intellectually and theologically justified partiality, not so
much towards one’s own religion or even towards a religious
tradition other than one’s own – both do occur, and both are
biases, one of the hegemonic type, the other of the romantic
type – but rather towards the religious life itself. I wonder if
such a stance disqualifies the non religious understanding of re
ligion. As I have learned from associating with theologians for
more than thirty years, it may well be that our use as religious
studies specialists is still considered that of an ancilla, a hand
maiden to theology. The finer craft – that of an embodied ex
perience and a spiritual transformation, allowed only after the
meticulous reading of texts, the empirical description of a
particular object of study, and the conceptual ordering have
been executed according to the métier of the academic study of
religion – still appears to be left only to insiders, to theologians,
to those who “belong.” The crowning exercise, that of an in
terior dialogue and a transformation that is both personally
spiritual and theological, would ultimately justify the intellec
tual efforts by its utility and its capacity to inspire the partici
pants into becoming better people with a higher sense of be
longing.
If this is the case, then what may look cautious, delicate,
and patient in Clooney’s books may well be suspected of hav
ing an underlying motive. Genetically speaking, from the per
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spective of evolutionary biology, the persistence of religion may
be due partly to its advantage for the survival of the species by
individual people’s surrender to a greater sense of self, be it a
nuclear family, a tribe, or society, humanity, and life in general.
Belief and belonging are in our genes, so to speak. But nar
rowing this down to the actual life world, the global map in
which ESITIS conferences, for all kinds of reasons, manage to
draw mainly Western theologians, I feel pressed to voice some
of my caveats, not only from the ongoing discussion on the aca
demic distinction between religious understanding and under
standing religion but also about the same old pitfalls to which
the comparative enterprise is prone, especially in the hands of
theology. One should beware of going in circles and beware of
an agenda not unlike the seafaring of our colonial forebears
who brought cargoes of spices home.
There is no denying that our kitchen has gained much
from those forays into foreign lands. But was it fair trade? Like
wise, is it fair trade when Western theologians execute a faith
based exercise in comparative theology, however spiritually
uplifting?
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